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SUMMARY 
 
In Ireland, approximately 30 per cent of the population (“medical cardholders”) receive free GP 
services  while the remainder  (“non-medical  cardholders”)  must pay for each visit. In 1989, the 
manner  in which  GPs  were  reimbursed  by  the State  for  their  medical  cardholder  patients  was 
changed from fee-for-service to capitation while other patients continued to pay on a fee-for-service 
basis. Concerns about supplier-induced demand were in part responsible for this policy change. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the utilisation of GP services is influenced 
by the reimbursement system facing GPs, by comparing visiting rates for the two groups before and 
after this change. Using a difference-in-differences approach on pooled micro-data from 1987, 1995 
and 2000, we find that medical card eligibility exerts a consistently positive and significant effect 
on the utilisation of GP services. However, the differential in visiting rates between medical 
cardholders  and  others  did  not  narrow  between  1987  and  1995  or  2000,  as  might  have  been 
anticipated if supplier-induced demand played a major role prior to the change in reimbursement 
system. 
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Differences 
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“GP REIMBURSEMENT AND VISITING BEHAVIOUR IN IRELAND” 
 
 
 
1.         INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important relationships  in health economics is that between the patient and the 
primary care physician or GP (general practitioner). As a result of asymmetric information between 
the GP and patient, an agency relationship develops where the GP acts as an agent for the patient in 
terms of decisions about health care. The extent to which the GP will act as a “perfect” agent (in the 
sense that his decision is precisely that which the patient himself would choose if he had the same 
knowledge as the GP) may be affected by the financial incentives facing the GP, including most 
obviously their reimbursement system.1 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps the most celebrated example of self-interest on behalf of the GP is the phenomenon known 
as “supplier-induced-demand”  (SID)  whereby  the GP is able to influence  the demand  for their 
service by shifting the demand curve to the right. For example, suppose the GP has a “target” level 
of income which he wishes to achieve each month and suppose there is an exogenous increase in 
the number of GPs in his locality. The rightward shift of the supply curve of GPs will lead to an 
increase in the use of GP services (summarised say by the number of visits to a GP). Assuming that 
the demand for visits is inelastic, the total amount spent on visits will fall and since there has been 
an increase in the number of GPs and a fall in total GP income, income per GP must fall. Via the 
agency relationship however (whereby for example repeat visits by patients are likely to be heavily 
influenced by the advice of the GP) GPs may be able to induce a rightward shift of the demand 
curve in an attempt to offset the decline in GP income. 
 
 
 
Previous research on SID has tended to concentrate on the identification of SID in this context, i.e., 
examining the relationship between physician density and utilisation. Like Rossiter and Wilensky 
[2], Tussing [1,3] had the advantage of utilisation data that could distinguish between physician- 
initiated   and  patient-initiated   visits.  He  asked  patients   attending   GPs  whether   the  present 
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consultation was their own or the GP’s idea and in addition, whether the visit led to a future return 
visit being arranged. He found that GP-initiated and return visits were correlated with GP density in 
the direction predicted by SID. He also found that such visits were lower in areas where there was a 
higher proportion of patients with free GP care. He concludes that since GP utilisation is higher 
amongst such patients there is less need for compensatory induced demand. Tussing’s approach has 
been criticised (see Sørensen and Grytten [4]) on the basis that he did not control sufficiently for the 
underlying  health  of  the  population.  Thus  if  there  is  a  higher  incidence  of  underlying  health 
problems  in  those  areas  with  the  highest  physician  density  then  a positive  correlation  may  be 
observed  between  density  and utilisation,  even  though  no inducement  is taking  place.2   Despite 
 
numerous studies analysing SID in this context, evidence in favour of SID has been mixed. In a 
sequence  of  papers  examining  SID  in  the  Norwegian  health  system,  Carlsen  and  Grytten  [5], 
Grytten et al. [6], Grytten et al. [7] and Grytten and Sørensen [8] found no significant effect of 
physician  density  on  the  utilisation  of  physician  services,  with  the  exception  of  some  limited 
evidence regarding laboratory tests in the 1995 paper. However, Birch [9], Cromwell and Mitchell 
[10] and Rossiter and Wilensky [2] all find some evidence for SID in the context of dental visits in 
the UK, surgery rates in the US and physician-initiated medical expenditures in the US respectively. 
 
 
 
The patient’s degree of access to free medical services and the method by which physicians are 
reimbursed for the services they provide may also influence the degree to which physicians engage 
in self-interested behaviour. Rossiter and Wilensky [2] find that physician-initiated expenditures on 
both total, and ambulatory  care, medical services in the US are significantly  greater for patients 
with  public  (Medicaid  or  Medicare)  and/or  private  medical  insurance.  While  in  this  case,  the 
method of reimbursement  does not differ across patients or across areas, if demand inducement 
incurs a cost to the doctor in terms of the effort involved in convincing the patient that a return visit 
is  warranted,  the  degree  to  which  patients  differ  in  their  degree  of  coverage  for  free  medical 
services also influences the financial incentives towards demand inducement. Grytten and Sørensen 
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[8] examine demand inducement in the context of the Norwegian system of GP care where the two 
groups of GPs differ in the incentives for inducement. Approximately  75 per cent of Norwegian 
GPs are contract GPs and receive a fixed fee-for-service payment from their local municipality for 
every visit and for any additional laboratory tests that they provide. The remaining 25 per cent of 
GPs receive a fixed salary. However, they find no significant difference in the mean number of 
laboratory tests between contract and salaried doctors or in the proportion of visits lasting longer 
than twenty minutes (for which contract doctors receive additional payments over an above their 
fixed fee). 
 
 
 
While clear-cut evidence of SID as outlined above has been difficult to obtain there is nevertheless 
plenty of evidence that physicians in general (and not just GPs) do respond to financial incentives. 
Croxson et al. [11] show how GPs in the UK responded to the introduction of the GP fundholder 
scheme. The nature of the scheme gave GPs a financial incentive to increase hospital-based activity 
prior to entry to the scheme, which is precisely what Croxson et al. [11] found to be the case, even 
after allowing for selection into the fundholding scheme. Developing the same theme, Dusheiko et 
al. [12] show how GPs in the UK responded to the financial incentives offered by the abolition of 
the  fundholding  scheme;  once  again  behaviour  was  in  the  direction  indicated  by  the  financial 
incentive. 
 
 
 
Ireland provides a valuable test-case in this context, because a change in the basis on which GPs 
were reimbursed affecting only part of the population allows the impact of financial incentives on 
visiting to be investigated. Since 1989, GPs face differing reimbursement methods depending on 
whether their patients are eligible for free GP services or are paying for their own care. In Ireland, 
individuals  below  an  income  threshold,  termed  “medical  cardholders”,  are  entitled  to  free  GP 
consultations while the remainder of the population must pay the full cost of each consultation.3  In 
 
2001, 28 per cent of the adult population held a medical card (Central Statistics Office [14]). GPs in 
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Ireland are self-employed practitioners. Approximately two-thirds of GPs enter into contract with 
the State to provide services to medical cardholders. Individuals who are eligible for a medical card 
then choose a GP, and GPs must treat their medical card patients the same as their non-medical card 
patients in terms of access to surgery hours etc. Prior to 1989, GPs were reimbursed on a fee-per- 
service basis for both medical cardholder and non-medical cardholder patients, by the State and the 
patient respectively. In part in response to evidence in favour of demand inducement presented by 
Tussing [3], the reimbursement system for medical cardholder patients was changed from fee-for- 
service to capitation in 1989. As outlined in the simple model in Section 2, this exogenous change 
in reimbursement method in relation to medical cardholder patients led to a clear change in the 
financial incentives facing GPs, and provides a natural experiment whereby we can investigate the 
extent to which they responded to such a change.4 
 
 
 
 
Using micro-data from large-scale household surveys from 1987, 1995 and 2000, a difference-in- 
differences approach is employed to analyse the extent to which the utilisation of GP services was 
influenced  by the change  in reimbursement  in 1989.  Section  2 outlines  a simple  model  of GP 
behaviour illustrating how GPs might respond to the financial incentives implied by such a change 
in reimbursement regime. It also describes the difference-in-differences methodology, which we use 
to examine  the  effects  of the  change  in  reimbursement.  In section  3  we  discuss  our  data  and 
variables, while in Section 4 the econometric approaches are briefly outlined. Section 5 presents 
empirical results and Section 6 summarises and concludes. 
 
 
 
2.         THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In empirical  studies of the role of financial  incentives  in this context,  the underlying  structural 
model is most often implicit rather than spelt out. In this section we sketch out a model which 
brings out some of the core elements involved. It is necessarily simple and leaves out a range of 
potentially important factors – such as health insurance, differences in preferences between income 
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groups, and rising expectations – some of which we incorporate into our subsequent econometric 
analysis.  None the less, it is of interest in itself and helps to provide  an illustrative  framework 
within which that analysis can be seen. 
 
 
 
Suppose  that  GPs  face  two  types  of  patients,  medical  cardholder  patients  and  non-medical 
cardholders patients. We assume that initially the reimbursement system is fee-for-service, but in 
the case of medical cardholder patients that this fee is paid by the state. We also assume that the 
patient initiates the initial visit to a GP; GPs can only influence (induce) subsequent  visits. We 
assume a very simple utility function for GPs, which includes their gross revenue less the cost of 
effort  (of  carrying  out a consultation).  For  convenience  of exposition  we  separate  utility  from 
treating  medical cardholder  (public) patients  and from treating non-medical  cardholder  (private) 
patients.  Utility  from  treating  medical  cardholder  patients  is  given  by  the  revenue  from  visits 
 
initiated by the patient, pQPUB , and revenue initiated by induced visits, pQ
ind    . We assume that the 
 
number  of  visits  initiated  by  the  patient  depends  upon  their  underlying  health,  H,  and  a  taste 
 
parameter, α. Thus we have: 
 
 
 
 
U PUB = pPUB .QPUB ( H  PUB ,αPUB ) + p  PUB ind PUB − e( Q  PUB ind PUB (1) 
 
 
 
 
Utility from treating non-medical cardholder patients is likewise given by: 
 
 
 
 
U PRIV = pPRIV .QPRIV ( H PRIV ,αPRIV ) + p  PRIV ind PRIV − e( Q  PRIV ind PRIV (2) 
 
 
 
 
We make the crucial assumption that the marginal cost in terms of effort of inducing an extra visit 
 
from a non-medical cardholder patient is at least as great as it is from a medical cardholder patient 
 
i.e., ind PRIV ) ≥ e′( Qind ) . This is because the medical cardholder patient will not have to meet the 
 
cost of the induced visit whereas the non-medical cardholder patient will. Thus either the GP will 
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∂Q MED 
∂Q PRIV 
have to spend extra effort in trying to persuade the non-medical cardholder patient that a return visit 
 
is warranted, or the GP may have to charge a reduced fee. We also assume that the e(.) function is 
 
convex i.e., e′ (.) ≥ 0 . This is necessary in order to obtain an internal solution. 
 
 
 
 
We also assume that the fee charged for a medical cardholder patient is less than that obtained for a 
 
non-medical  cardholder  patient i.e., pPUB  < pPRIV .   This is consistent with evidence presented in 
 
Tussing [1]. Assume also for the moment that the only choice variable open to the GP is the amount 
of induced visits. Thus the GP is assumed to have no influence upon patient-initiated visits nor upon 
the fee charged. (The assumption that GPs are price takers is certainly true for medical cardholder 
patients, but for patients paying out-of-pocket, an individual GP may not be able to raise the price 
of a visit much if others in locality do not, but GPs as a group may well be able to do so). 
 
 
 
The first order conditions for the GP are then: 
 
 
 
 
∂U 
ind 
MED 
= pMED − e′( Qind ) = 0 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
 
∂U 
ind 
PRIV 
= pPRIV − e′( Qind ) = 0 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
The first order conditions can be represented diagrammatically below: 
 
 
 
MB, MC  
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MC Public 
 
 
Private fee 
 
Public fee 
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Induced visits
  
this is a consequence  of the 
QPUB  = QPRIV  = Q . 
 
convexity  of  the  e(.)  function.  Since  fees  are  fixed,  the  marginal  benefit  curves  are  straight 
horizontal lines. The GP induces visits for both sets of patients; we cannot determine the precise 
quantity of induced non-medical cardholder and medical cardholder visits as this will depend upon 
the positions of the relative curves. In the diagram here an equal number of non-medical cardholder 
 
and medical cardholder visits are induced i.e., Qind ind PRIV = Q* . 
 
 
 
 
Now suppose  that the reform introduced  in Ireland in 1989 is incorporated  into the model i.e., 
payments for medical cardholder patients switch from a fee-for-service arrangement to a capitation 
system. The weighted capitation payment that GPs receive for their medical cardholder patients 
depends upon demographic factors such as the age and gender of the patients on their list. Crucially 
however, the absence of a fee-for-service for these patients removes the financial incentives for GPs 
to induce return visits. The utility function for medical cardholder patients now changes to: 
 
 
 
 
U PUB = N PUB ( DPUB ) − e( Q  PUB ind PUB (5) 
 
 
 
 
where N PUB refers to the number of medical cardholder patients on a GP’s list and DPUB refers to 
 
the underlying demographic factors influencing the weighted capitation payment. 
 
 
 
The utility function for non-medical cardholder patients remains as before. The first order condition 
for medical cardholder patients now becomes: 
 
 
 
 
∂U 
ind 
PUB 
= −e′( Qind ) < 0 
 
(6) 
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This clearly  indicates  a corner solution  and implies  that GPs will induce zero visits from non- 
 
medical cardholder patients. The diagram changes to below: 
 
 
 
 
 
MB, MC  
MC Private 
 
 
MC Public 
 
 
Private fee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ind 
GMS priv  = Q Induced visits, Public fee 
 
 
 
 
The medical card fee schedule is now effectively the horizontal axis and hence the corner solution 
 
ind 
PUB is obtained. It is possible that GPs will increase their private fees to offset this loss in 
 
income and in turn they may induce extra visits by non-medical cardholder patients. The effect on 
overall induced visits would then be ambiguous. 
 
What  will  be  the  overall  effect  on  total  utilisation  by  medical  cardholder  and  non-medical 
cardholder  patients  before  and  after  the reform?  Before  the reform  total  utilisation  by  medical 
 
cardholder  patients  will be equal  to induced  and non-induced  visits  i.e. Q0 ,PUB = Q0 ,PUB ind 0 ,PUB 
 
where the “0” subscript refers to the period before the reform. Alternatively per capita utilisation 
 
can be expressed as q0 ,PUB = q0 ,PUB ind 0 ,PUB where lower-case refers to utilisation per head. Similarly 
 
total  per  capita  utilisation  for  non-medical  cardholder  patients  will  be q0 ,PRIV = q0 ,PRIV ind 0 ,PRIV 
 
Following the reform we now have q1,PUB = q1,PUB 
ind 
1,PUB and q1,PRIV = q1,PRIV 
ind 
1,PRIV 
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) + ( q − q ) − ( q − q 
( q − q ( q − q 
) 
) 
For  medical  cardholders,   the  difference  in  total  utilisation   before  and  after  the  reform  is 
 
( q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB ) . The difference for non-medical cardholders is ( q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB ) . The difference in 
 
the differences can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
( q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB ) − ( q0 ,PRIV  − q1,PRIV  ) (7) 
 
 
 
 
ind
 
ind
 
ind
 
ind
 
= q0 ,PUB  + q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB  − q1,PUB  − q0 ,PRIV  − q0 ,PRIV  + q1,PRIV  + q1,PRIV 
 
 
 
 
= ( q0 ,PUB − q1,PUB ) − ( q0 ,PRIV − q1,PRIV ind 0 ,PUB ind 1,PUB ind 0 ,PRIV ind 1,PRIV 
 
 
 
 
On the basis of the model outlined above, plus a number of reasonable assumptions, it should be 
 
possible to sign the above expression. Take the first two terms on the left-hand-side of the above 
 
equation, ( q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB ) and ( q0 ,PRIV  − q1,PRIV  ) . These  terms represent  the change  in GP visits 
 
before and after the reform initiated by the patients themselves. If we assume what is what is known 
as the “common macroeconomic effect” then there should be no difference in the growth rates for 
patient-initiated  visits for medical cardholder and non-medical  cardholder patients.5  Thus overall 
these terms should be zero. 
 
 
 
 
Turning now to the latter two terms, ind 0 ,PUB 
ind 
1,PUB and 
ind 
1,PRIV 
ind 
0 ,PRIV ) , our model outlined 
 
above predicts that the first of these terms will be unambiguously positive. The change in 
reimbursement  will drive induced visits for medical cardholder patients to zero in period 1. The 
model is less clear-cut regarding what will happen the second term. However, as discussed above, 
the strong likelihood is that it will be non-negative i.e., induced visits for non-medical cardholder 
patients will not fall from period 0 to period 1 and may well increase. 
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Thus, overall our model predicts that the difference-in-differences should be positive. However, 
relaxing the assumption that GPs are price-takers then complicates the situation. If GPs increase the 
fees charged to non-medical cardholder patients in order to offset the fall in income brought about 
by the reform, then the overall effect will be ambiguous. This is because the second term on the left- 
 
hand side ( q0 ,PRIV  − q1,PRIV  ) may well turn out to be positive. However, if demand is price inelastic, 
 
it is likely that this effect will be dominated by the combined positive effect of the latter two terms. 
 
 
 
 
As  discussed  in  Section  3  below,  our  data  allow  us  to  clearly  identify  a  treatment  (medical 
cardholder) and a control (non-medical cardholder) group, as well as a treatment (pre-1989) and a 
control (post-1989) period. Following the discussion in Wooldridge [19] let A be the control group 
and B the treatment group. Thus the dummy variable dB equals one for those in the treatment group 
and it is zero otherwise. Similarly let d2 be the dummy variable for the treatment period (i.e., before 
the policy change). Then the simplest equation for analysing the impact of the policy change is: 
 
 
 
 
y = β 0 + δ 0 d 2 + β1dB + δ1d 2 ⋅ dB + u (8) 
 
 
 
 
where y is the outcome of interest. The dummy variable d2 captures the aggregate factors that affect 
both the treatment and control groups over time. The variable dB captures differences between the 
control and treatment groups before the policy change. The coefficient δ1  captures the effect of the 
 
interaction  between the policy change and the treatment group as the term d 2 ⋅ dB only takes a 
 
value of unity for those observations in the treatment group in the treatment period. 
 
 
 
 
If we estimate the above relationship by OLS and let y A,1  denote the sample average of y for the 
 
control group for the control period and let y A,2 denote its value for the control group for the 
 
treatment period.  Define y B,1  and y B,2  similarly. Then the OLS estimator δˆ    can be expressed as: 
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δ 
1 
δ 
1 
1 
1 
ˆ  = ( y B,2 − y B,1 ) − ( y A,2 − y A,1 ) 
 
(9) 
 
 
 
 
and  is known  as the  difference-in-differences  estimator.  We  can  see how  this  is equivalent  to 
 
expression  (7),  i.e., ( q0 ,PUB  − q1,PUB ) − ( q0 ,PRIV  − q1,PRIV  ) .  The  use  of ˆ   means  that  both  group- 
 
specific and time-specific factors are controlled for. One important assumption which must be 
maintained for δˆ    to be a valid estimator of the policy change is that other macroeconomic events 
(apart from the policy change), which might occur between the treatment and control groups, should 
 
affect both treatment and control groups equally. As pointed out by Wooldridge [19] it is customary 
to include other independent variables in the estimated equation (10). These allow for the fact that 
the random samples within a group may differ systematically over the two time periods. In this case 
 
 
the interpretation of ˆ   remains essentially  unchanged.  We propose to estimate the above model 
 
using four different econometric methodologies, both with and without additional independent 
variables. 
 
 
 
3.         DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
Two data sources are employed in this paper. The first is the 1987 Survey of Income Distribution, 
Poverty and Usage of State Services, which was carried out by the Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI) between October 1986 and September  1987. A more detailed description  of the 
design and conduct of the survey as well as response rates and the representativeness  of the survey 
are provided in Nolan [20] and Callan et al. [21]. Health information on medical card eligibility, 
insurance coverage, number of visits to GPs, number of nights in hospital etc. were obtained for all 
individuals  in the household  from the head of household  (HOH)  or the spouse  of the HOH. In 
addition,  each adult aged 15 years and over completed  a personal  questionnaire.  This covered  a 
wide  range  of information  on labour  force  status,  occupation,  income,  style  of living,  financial 
situation  and  attitudes.  It  also  included  some  questions  on  health  status,  both  physical  and 
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psychological. The latter represented a major advantage of these data over the earlier 1980 data set 
employed by Tussing [1,3]. 
 
 
 
The second source of data is the Living in Ireland (LII) Survey. The LII Survey was also carried out 
by the ESRI  and constitute  the Irish  component  of the European  Community  Household  Panel 
(ECHP).  The  ECHP  began  in  1994  and  ended  in  2001.  It  involved  an  annual  survey  of  a 
representative sample of private households and individuals aged 16 years and over in each EU 
member state, based on a standardised questionnaire. Where possible, the same households were 
followed through time. Similar questions to those asked in the 1987 Survey were included in the LII 
Surveys. However, while the HOH or spouse of the HOH provided information on each individual’s 
use of GP services, medical card eligibility etc. in the 1987 Survey, each adult aged 16 years and 
over provided this information personally in the LII Survey. As with the 1987 Survey, this personal 
questionnaire  also contains information on physical and psychological  health status. In this paper, 
data from the second (1995) and seventh (2000) waves of the LII Survey are analysed.6 
 
 
 
 
The samples include all adults aged 16 years and over, amounting to 9,421, 8,530 and 8,055 
observations  respectively.  After  deleting  observations  for  which  information  on  one  or  more 
variables  of interest  was missing7,  completed  observations  are available  for 6,713 individuals  in 
1987, 7,096 individuals in 1995 and 6,657 individuals in 2000. When the data are pooled across the 
 
three years, this gives a complete sample of 20,466 individuals. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 presents variable definitions for the various dependent and independent variables employed 
in this  study.  As  a number  of different  econometric  methodologies  are  proposed  to model  the 
utilisation of GP services (see Section 4), two dependent variables are necessary: a binary variable 
indicating whether the individual visited a GP in the previous twelve months (GPPOS) and a count 
variable recording the number of visits to a GP in the previous twelve months (GPVISITS). As is 
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evident from Table 2, the standard deviation of GPVISITS is consistently  larger than the mean, a 
feature of the data which has consequences for the choice of the most appropriate econometric 
methodology.  Schellhorn  [22]  discusses  the  problem  of  reporting  error  that  may  arise  when 
individuals  are  asked  to  recall  behaviour  over  a  long  period  of  time.  An  examination  of  the 
frequency of GP visits in Table 3 reveals that there are clusters at 6, 10 and 12 visits, which are 
consistent  with individuals  rounding  up or down the number  of visits or approximating  “once a 
month” for example. However, the percentage of individuals with such frequencies is only a small 
fraction of the total and is consequently not considered a problem. 
 
 
 
Summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 4. The demographic/socio- 
economic characteristics  of the individual are represented by variables describing the age, gender, 
household  location,  education  level,  employment  status,  marital  status,  household  income  and 
private insurance status of the individual. As the health status of the individual is consistently found 
to be the most significant factor explaining health services utilisation in previous studies, a number 
of indicators of physical and psychological health status are employed. Whether an individual gave 
birth during the previous twelve months is represented by a dummy variable. Individuals who report 
that they suffer from “any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or disability” (see 
Table 2 for the slightly different wording of this question in 1987) are subsequently  asked for the 
nature of this illness or disability; we have constructed a categorical variable with eleven categories 
corresponding  to various medical conditions with the base category indicating  that the individual 
did not indicate that they suffered from any chronic, physical or mental health problem, illness or 
disability. Scores from the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) are used to construct a variable 
indicating psychological health status. The GHQ contains twelve questions relating to psychological 
health status. For the six positive statements, a person scores one if they answer “less than usual” or 
“much less than usual” while for the six negative statements,  a person scores one if they answer 
“more than usual” or “much more than usual”. An example of a positive statement is “have you 
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recently  been  able  to concentrate  on whatever  you’re  doing?”  while  an example  of a negative 
statement  is “have  you  recently  lost  much  sleep  over  worry?”  These  scores  are  added  up  and 
constitute an ordinal variable indicating the degree of psychological distress; anyone scoring above 
the conventional  threshold  of two is considered  to be in psychological  distress  (see also Nolan 
[20]).8 
 
 
 
 
We include  a dummy  variable  with the value  one indicating  individuals  who are eligible  for a 
medical  card,  i.e.,  the  treatment  group.  A  dummy  variable  with  the  value  one  for  individuals 
surveyed in 1987 indicates the period before the change in reimbursement, i.e., the treatment period. 
In line with the difference-in-differences  approach outlined above we also include a variable called 
med87, the interaction term between medical card status and the fee-for-service regime for medical 
cardholders. The coefficient on this variable captures the effect of the policy of fee-for-service 
reimbursement for medical cardholders and the model outlined above predicts that this coefficient 
should  be  positive  and  significant.  Finally  because  the  post-regime  period  includes  two  cross- 
sections of the LII Survey, we include an additional dummy variable with the value one indicating 
observations surveyed in 1995. 
 
 
 
Table  2  presents  the  average  number  of  GP  visits  for  medical  cardholder  and  non-medical 
cardholder patients for each of the three years, 1987, 1995 and 2000 and for the pooled sample. As 
expected, medical cardholders have a higher number of annual visits to their GP than non-medical 
cardholders  in  all  years,  reflecting  most  importantly  the  difference  in  the  relative  price  of  a 
consultation between the two groups and also the distribution of age and health status across the two 
groups.  For  both  groups  of  patient,  the  average  number  of  GP  visits  fell  from  1987  to  1995. 
However, while medical cardholder visits fell by a smaller percentage between 1987 and 1995 than 
those of non-medical cardholders, medical cardholders’ visits recovered to much nearer their 1987 
level than those of non-medical  cardholders  by 2000. As our model treats 1987 as the treatment 
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group and 1995/2000 as the control group, the statistics in Table 2 indicate that the magnitude of the 
reduction in visits after the reform was greater for non-medical cardholder patients, contrary to the 
predictions from our model. It is the objective of the multivariate analysis undertaken in Section 5 
to determine  a) whether  there is a significant  difference  between  medical  cardholders  and non- 
medical cardholders in patterns of utilisation pre- and post-1989 and b) whether this difference, if 
any, persists when other demographic, socio-economic and health status variables are taken into 
account. 
 
 
 
4.         ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGIES 
 
The dependent variable (the number of visits to a GP in the previous twelve months) is a variable 
that can only take on non-negative integer values. In addition, the distribution of GP visits is highly 
skewed (a large proportion of observations are clustered at zero while only a small proportion of 
individuals record frequent visits (see Table 4)). This necessitates the use of count data econometric 
methodologies,  which assume a skewed, discrete distribution and restrict predicted values to non- 
negative values. The most basic count data model is the Poisson model; however it is rarely used in 
applied work as an underlying assumption of the model is that the expected mean and variance of 
the dependent variable are equal. Table 2 indicates that this assumption is violated for our data. The 
alternative negative binomial model overcomes this problem. However, model selection tests (see 
below) favour the generalised  negative binomial over the standard negative binomial model. The 
generalised  negative  binomial  model  allows  α  (the  parameter  estimated  within  the  negative 
binomial model which represents unobserved population heterogeneity,  a possible source of over- 
dispersion) to differ across observations by specifying it as a function of observed characteristics as 
follows: 
 
αi  = exp( zi' γ ) (10) 
 
where  zi are the set of independent  variables,  which  may  be the same  as xi . The generalised 
 
negative binomial model therefore takes the form: 
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where δ i  = exp(xi' β ) exp(ε i ) and ε i   has a gamma distribution with mean one and variance α i . 
 
 
 
 
The standard and generalised negative binomial models assume that all individuals have a positive 
probability  of  experiencing  the  event  in  question.  A  number  of  authors  (Durkan  et  al.  [32], 
Giuffrida [33] and Kelleher and McElroy [34]), question the validity of assuming that all zero 
observations are generated from the same underlying decision-making  structure. It is important to 
ascertain whether zero observations relate to true non-participants (i.e., individuals that would never 
visit a GP) or to individuals who are potential participants (i.e., individuals who do visit their GP 
but who are not observed doing so during the survey period in question). The zero-inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models allow us to distinguish between different 
sources of zero observations and in the process, overcome the problem whereby conventional count 
data methodologies may under-estimate the true extent of the zero observations. However, model 
selection tests (see below) favour both the two-step and generalised negative binomial models over 
the ZINB, suggesting that the distinction between actual and potential participants  is not a useful 
one for our data (probably due to the relatively long length of the survey period). 
 
 
 
A number  of authors  (Buchmueller  et al. [35], Gerdtham  [36],  Hakkinen  et al. [24], Hurd  and 
McGarry [28], Nolan [20,39], Pohlmeier and Ulrich [37], Tussing [1] and Van Doorslaer et al. [38]) 
have  argued  that two-step  approaches  are more  appropriate  in accounting  for the nature  of the 
decision-making  process underlying the decision to visit a GP. They argue that different variables 
may affect the decision to visit a GP (contact decision) and secondly, the decision about frequency 
of visits  (frequency  decision).  In addition,  the same variables  may  affect  the two stages  of the 
decision-making  process in different ways. The most common interpretation of the two-step model 
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is in terms of a principal-agent framework whereby the patient initiates the visit to their GP but the 
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GP decides on the frequency of treatment. The first stage is modelled using a binary choice model 
(logit or probit) while a variety of techniques  are used for the second stage, including  truncated 
OLS,  Poisson  and negative  binomial  methodologies.  As the second  stage variable  is an integer 
count  variable,  we  consider  only  truncated  Poisson  or  negative  binomial  specifications  for  the 
second  stage  (see  also  Gerdtham  [36],  Grootendorst  [40],  Hakkinen  et al. [24],  Pohlmeier  and 
Ulrich [37] and Van Doorslaer et al. [38]). Model selection tests (see below) favour the truncated 
negative  binomial  over  the  truncated  Poisson  specification  for  the  second  step.  The  two-step 
negative binomial model therefore consists of two stages which may be estimated separately: 
•  A binary model (e.g. probit), which estimates  the probability  that an individual  visited a GP 
 
within the observation period, i.e., 
P (yi  > 0 ) = F (xi' β ) 
where  F (.) is the logistic/standard normal cumulative distribution function and  xi 
 
 
 
(12) 
 
 
are the set of 
 
independent variables. 
 
• A truncated negative binomial model for positive observations, i.e., 
 
P(y  | y 0 )
 exp(− δ i )(δ i ) i  , for y 0 i i  > yi ! [1 − exp(− δ i )] 
(13) 
 
where δ i  = exp(xi' β ) exp(ε i ) and ε i   has a gamma distribution with mean one and variance α . 
 
 
 
 
Gerdtham   [36],  Jimenez-Martin   et  al.  [25],   Kelleher   and  McElroy   [34],  Santos-Silva   and 
Windmeijer [41] and Vera-Hernandez [30] argue that the two-step methodology is only appropriate 
when the data refer to a single illness spell, an assumption  that is often violated in surveys that 
record  health  services  utilisation  over  relatively  long  periods  of  time  such  as  a  year.  Indeed, 
Jimenez-Martin  et al. [25] find that the two-step model is rejected in favour of the basic negative 
binomial model in their study of the determinants  of GP visits in twelve European countries and 
argue  that this is due to the restrictive  assumptions  about  illness  spells underlying  the two-step 
model. In interpreting  the results from this model, it is important to bear this limitation in mind. 
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However, as we are primarily interested in changes over time, once the distribution of illness spells 
over the survey period does not change between 1987 and 1995/2000 (and we have no reason to 
believe that it did), the results from this model are still useful. More sophisticated modelling 
alternatives such as GMM estimation of both processes developed by Santos Silva and Windmeijer 
[41] or finite mixture models applied by Gerdtham and Trivedi [42] are not considered here as we 
are primarily interested in the effect of the change in reimbursement rather than the specification of 
the most appropriate model for estimating GP services utilisation. 
 
 
 
We  therefore  estimate,  and  present  the  results  of,  four  models:  negative  binomial,  generalised 
negative binomial, zero-inflated negative binomial and two-step negative binomial.9 We base the 
discussion on the results from the generalised negative binomial model as it is preferred on the basis 
of model selection tests but make reference to the two-step model where differences arise. The set 
of independent  variables is comparable  across all three years (with the exception  of the physical 
illness variable where the underlying question changed slightly between 1987 and 1995/2000; see 
Table 1 for further details). Each of the models is estimated using STATA8 and marginal effects 
and standard errors are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Marginal effects for the continuous independent 
variables are calculated at the mean of the independent variable of interest while marginal effects 
for discrete independent variables are calculated as the difference in the expected value of the 
dependent variable when the independent variable of interest takes the value zero and when it takes 
the value one. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. Finally, all standard errors are 
adjusted to take into account the fact that observations are clustered by household. 
 
 
 
5.         EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Looking first at the results without additional independent variables (i.e., with just treatment group 
and period dummies and the interaction dummy between treatment period and treatment group) for 
the  generalised  negative  binomial  model,  column  (3)  in  Table  5 indicates  that  GP  visits  were 
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significantly higher for medical cardholders across the period of our analysis; this is consistent with 
evidence presented in Tussing [1,3] and Nolan [20,39] that medical cardholders consume more GP 
services  due  to  the  zero  monetary  cost  they  face  in  visiting  their  GP.  It  is  also  possible  that 
eligibility  for a medical  card  distorts  the relative  prices  of GP substitutes.  While  a GP visit  is 
necessary to receive a referral to a specialist (except in emergencies), the fact that non-medical 
cardholders  must pay the full cost of a GP consultation  but receive heavily subsidised, or free (if 
privately insured) specialist care in hospital may also explain this result. In addition, as waiting lists 
for elective  surgery  are higher  for public  than for private  patients,  this may  mean  that medical 
cardholder patients use their GP more intensively due to accessibility.10  On average, GP visits for 
 
both groups were significantly  higher in 1987 and significantly  lower in 1995 than in 2000. Most 
importantly however, the results indicate that, contrary to the predictions from a model highlighting 
supplier-induced  demand,  there  is a negative  and  significant  difference-in-differences   effect.  In 
other words, the difference between medical cardholders’ visits in 1987 and 1995/2000 was 
significantly   less  than  the  difference   between   non-medical   cardholders’   visits  in  1987  and 
1995/2000.  While  both  groups  visited  their  GP less  in 1995/2000  than  in 1987,  the  regression 
results confirm that the reduction was actually larger for non-medical cardholders than for medical 
cardholders. 
 
 
 
The results from the two-step model in Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5, while very similar to those 
for  the  generalised  negative  binomial,  show  one  exception.  The  probability  of  a  GP  visit  is 
significantly  lower in 1987 than in 2000; this is consistent with the patterns in Table 2 where the 
proportion of the population visiting at least once increased from 1987 to 2000, even though the 
average number of visits for those visiting at least once declined. 
 
 
 
Turning to the analyses  including  additional  independent  variables  hypothesised  to influence  GP 
 
visits, Column (3) in Table 7 indicates that once again, medical cardholders consume significantly 
23  
more GP services than non-medical cardholders although the effect has declined in magnitude. GP 
visits are significantly  higher  in 1987 than in 2000 but there is no significant  difference  in the 
average number of GP visits between 1995 and 2000. The inclusion  of additional  variables now 
means  that  the  difference-in-differences   effect  becomes  insignificant.  For  the  two-step  model, 
Columns (4) and (5) indicate that the difference-in-differences  estimate remains negative and 
significant:   the  difference  between  medical  cardholders’   visits  in  1987  and  1995/2000   was 
significantly   less  than  the  difference   between   non-medical   cardholders’   visits  in  1987  and 
1995/2000. 
 
 
 
 
These results, on the face of it, do not lend support to the notion that supplier-induced  demand was 
a major contributor to the differential in visiting rates between medical cardholders and others prior 
to the change in reimbursement  system, since that change did not narrow the differential. Visiting 
rates by medical cardholders did fall, however, which is in itself consistent with an impact of the 
switch to capitation for them: the differential did not fall because visiting rates fell (even more) for 
the rest of the population. This could reflect inter alia a response of non-medical cardholders to 
increases in the price of a GP visit. That obviously would not have affected medical cardholders, 
leaving some scope for the change in reimbursement  to have been a contributory  factor in falling 
visiting rates for them. We cannot test for the potential scale of such a price effect with just three 
observations  over  time,  but  it  has  to  be  kept  in  mind.  So  while  the  empirical  results  do  not 
demonstrate a significant impact from the change in reimbursement system, they do not rule out the 
possibility that it had some independent effect in reducing visiting rates for those affected. 
 
 
 
The  remainder   of  the  independent   variables   have   effects   that  are  largely   consistent   with 
expectations  and  with  previous  research  analysing  the  utilisation  of  GP  services  at  the  cross- 
sectional level (see for example Tussing [1,3] and Nolan [20,39] for research using Irish data). The 
health status variables are all positive and highly significant, in common with results found in the 
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above studies. The results from the two-step  model suggest that some variables (such as marital 
status, household location, education, income and insurance status) have different effects on the two 
decisions  (contact  and  frequency   decision).  The  effect  of  having  private  medical  insurance 
significantly increases the probability of visiting a GP but is negative and significant in determining 
the frequency of visits for those with at least one visit. While private medical insurance does not in 
general cover the cost of GP consultations (except where large deductibles are exceeded), the 
significance of insurance in determining the contact decision may reflect differences in attitudes 
towards  health  care  between  the  two  groups  with  those  covered  by  private  medical  insurance 
possibly more risk averse than those without. It is also possible that the GP realises that the patient 
is not covered by insurance for GP visits but would be covered for an out-patient consultation in 
hospital and recommends this route instead of a follow-up consultation with the GP. As discussed 
in Section 1, many studies include urban/rural location to proxy physician density in an attempt to 
identify SID. Our results provide no such evidence, except in the case of the probit model where 
individuals resident in rural areas (with presumably lower physician densities) have a significantly 
lower probability of visiting their GP. However this is more likely to indicate a distance or travel 
time effect, with those resident in rural areas facing higher travel and time costs associated with a 
GP visit, rather than any absence of an incentive for demand inducement on the part of GPs in such 
areas. 
 
 
 
6.         SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This  paper  has  used  a  difference-in-differences   methodology  to  analyse  whether  Irish  General 
 
Practitioners’ behaviour changed following a change in the financial incentives facing them. Up to 
 
1989, GPs were remunerated on a fee-for-service basis by the State for low-income patients, but the 
system was then changed to a capitation basis. The remainder of the population has continued to 
pay for GP visits out-of-pocket throughout. The purpose of this paper was to identify whether this 
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change in reimbursement  led to a change in visiting rates by low-income  patients compared with 
other patients. 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, our data do not distinguish between patient-initiated and GP-initiated visits and thus 
it is difficult to make direct inferences about GP behaviour from utilisation data. In addition, Rice 
and Labelle [43] argue that visits are not the primary means by which demand might be induced. 
Instead, a GP might induce demand by increasing the complexity of the consultation or ordering 
ancillary services (for which they may receive additional payments),  behaviours  that are that not 
picked up in utilisation data. None the less, the evidence presented here for Ireland shows clearly 
that the differential in visiting rates between low income groups and others did not narrow when the 
reimbursement system for the former was changed from fee for service to capitation, as might have 
been anticipated if supplier induced demand played a major role. 
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NOTES 
 
1 For an excellent and very readable introduction to this area see Tussing [1]. 
2  This highlights the problems associated with obtaining definitive evidence of SID in this context. As Carlsen and 
Grytten [5] point out, a positive relationship between physician supply and utilisation could be due to any one of four 
factors: SID, the demand response by patients to lower prices, the demand response to increased availability of doctors 
(which lowers the time and transport costs associated with a consultation) or the supply response to area-wide variations 
in factors that positively influence utilisation such as health status. 
3  There is no set fee for non-medical cardholder patients but it is worth noting that in 2000, the average fee for a GP 
consultation was €33. The same study also noted that between 1990 and 2000 doctors’ fees rose by an annual average of 
7.1 per cent compared to the overall annual inflation rate of 2.7 per cent, indicating a relative rise in the price of 
consultations (see Competition Authority [13]). 
4 For a discussion of natural experiments and evaluation in general see Blundell and Costa Dias [15]. See also Chiappori 
[16], Cockx and Brasseur [17] and Van de Voorde et al. [18] for similar analyses of natural experiments of the effect of 
an increase in co-payments for certain groups on the demand for physician services in France and Belgium. 
5 In the subsequent econometric analysis the validity of this assumption can be strengthened by including in the analysis 
additional regressors which might affect the underlying demand for GP services by medical cardholder and non-medical 
cardholder patients. These would include demographic and socio-economic factors such as age, gender and employment 
status. 
6  Data from 1994 are not used as the number of GP visits is not separately identified from the number of visits to 
medical specialists, dentists and opticians in that year. The 2001 data are not utilised as all over 70s automatically 
became eligible for a medical card from July 2001; this would have meant that inferences across time would be more 
difficult due to the substantial change in the characteristics of the medical card population from 2001. 
7 In all years, the majority of the missing observations occur for the health status questions, particularly psychological 
health status; this is due to the fact that the individual questionnaire was completed by proxy rather than in person for 
these individuals (because the person was ill, never at home or refused to co-operate with the interviewer) and as such 
questions such as education level and inquiring about physical and psychological health were particularly difficult to 
answer using proxy responses. A simple probit regression of missing values on age, gender and marital status (variables 
which are always observed) indicates that missing observations are significantly more likely for those that are aged 16- 
24 years, male and single. 
8  Cameron et al. [23], Hakkinen et al. [24], Jimenez-Martin et al. [25] and Schellhorn [22] all discuss the problem of 
using current measures of health status to predict past health services utilisation. All suggest that lagged measures be 
used instead. We do not employ this method in our study as the 1987 survey was a single cross-section and the physical 
health status question was not asked in 1994. However, we will consider this issue in a future paper analysing the full 
Living in Ireland panel. In addition, it is important to control for health status in analysing the demand for GP services. 
If those that are ill are more likely to hold medical cards/be insured, the positive effect of medical card 
eligibility/insurance on GP utilisation may not be the result of the incentive structures inherent in these systems but 
rather the result of adverse selection of the ill into these categories of eligibility/insurance coverage. A number of 
studies therefore treat insurance as an endogenously determined variable (see Cameron et al. [23], Harmon and Nolan 
[26], Holly et al. [27], Hurd and McGarry [28], Jones et al. [29], Schellhorn [22], Vera-Hernandez [30] and Waters 
[31]). While Harmon and Nolan [26] and Hurd and McGarry [28] either find that those in better health are more likely 
to be insured (and therefore that the positive effect of insurance coverage on health services utilisation is under-stated if 
insurance is not treated as an endogenous variable) or no evidence for adverse selection, we do not consider this 
possibility in this paper and instead rely on extensive health status variables to control for differences in health status. 
9  The results of model selection tests (likelihood ratio tests for the nested models and Vuong tests for the non-nested 
models), which are available on request from the authors, indicate that the negative binomial model is preferred to the 
Poisson model, the truncated negative binomial model is preferred to the truncated Poisson model, the ZINB is 
preferred to the ZIP, the generalised negative binomial model is preferred to both the negative binomial and the ZINB 
and the two-step negative binomial model is preferred to both the negative binomial and the ZINB. However the Vuong 
test of the generalised negative binomial model against the two-step negative binomial model was inconclusive. On the 
basis of information criteria, the generalised negative binomial model is preferred. 
10 We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
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Table 1 Variable Definitions for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
GPPOS =1 if visited a GP in the previous twelve months 
=0 otherwise 
GPVISITS Number of GP visits in the previous twelve months 
 
Age 25-34 
Age 35-44 
Age 45-54 
Age 55-64 
Age 65+ 
=1 if aged 25-34 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 35-44 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 45-54 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 55-64 years, =0 otherwise 
=1 if aged 65+ years, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = aged 16-24 years) 
 
Female =1 if female, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = male) 
 
Rural =1 if lives in household located in open country or in a village with 200 - 1,499 
inhabitants, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = lives in a household located in a town with 1,500 – 10,000 or more 
inhabitants or in Waterford, Galway, Limerick and Cork cities or Dublin city and 
county) 
 
Lower Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is lower secondary (i.e., intermediate/junior 
certificate), =0 otherwise 
Upper Secondary =1 if highest level of education completed is upper secondary (i.e., leaving certificate), 
=0 otherwise 
Third Level =1 if highest level of education completed is third level (i.e., diploma, primary degree or 
higher degree), =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = highest level of education completed is primary level) 
 
Married =1 if married, =0 otherwise 
Separated/Divorced =1 if separated or divorced, =0 otherwise 
Widow =1 if widowed, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = never married) 
 
Employed =1 if employed, =0 otherwise 
Unemployed =1 if unemployed or seeking employment, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = economically inactive (i.e., in education, engaged in home duties, 
retired, incapacitated for work etc.) 
Income Net Household Weekly Income in IR£1 (adjusted for household size and divided by 100) 
Medical Card =1 if have a medical card or covered on another family member’s card, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = does not have a medical card and is not covered on another family 
member’s card) 
 
Insurance =1 if insured either in own name or through another family member, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = not insured in own name or through another family member) 
Notes:   (i) While the majority of individuals with medical cards do not have private medical insurance, there are a 
number who have both and a number who have neither (38.7, 28.5 and 26.3 per cent had neither in 1987, 1995 
and 2000 respectively while 1.0, 1.6 per and 2.3 per cent had both in 1987, 1995 and 2000 respectively). 
(ii) household income is equivalised using the following scale: 1 for the HOH, 0.66 for any other adults over 
the age of 14 years and 0.33 for any children under the age of 14 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The euro was introduced in Ireland on 1 January 2002. 
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Table 1 continued 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Birth =1 if gave birth in previous twelve months, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = did not give birth in previous twelve months) 
 
GHQ GHQ score (ranges from 0 to 12; for each of the six negative statements score one if 
answer “more than usual” or “much more than usual” and for each of the six positive 
statements score one if answer “less than usual” or “much less than usual”) 
 
Disease                                =1 if nature of illness or disability is an infectious or parasitic disease or neoplasm or a 
congenital abnormality, =0 otherwise 
System                                 =1 if nature of illness or disability is an endocrine disorder, blood disorder, skin disorder 
or a genito-urinary problem, =0 otherwise 
Mental =1 if nature of illness or disability is a mental disorder, depression (defined in 2000 
only) or a mental handicap (defined in 2000 only), =0 otherwise 
Nerve =1 if nature of illness or disability is a nervous complaint or bad nerves, =0 otherwise 
Circ =1 if nature of illness or disability is a circulatory problem, =0 otherwise 
Resp =1 if nature of illness or disability is a respiratory problem, =0 otherwise 
Digest =1 if nature of illness or disability is a digestive problem, =0 otherwise 
Headache =1 if nature of illness or disability is headaches, =0 otherwise 
Musculo                               =1 if nature of illness or disability is a musculo-skeletal disorder, bad back or a physical 
handicap (defined in 2000 only), =0 otherwise 
Accident =1 if nature of illness or disability is an accident, =0 otherwise 
Other                                   =1 if nature of illness or disability is not specified or does not fall under the above 
classifications, =0 otherwise 
(Base Category = does not have any major illness, physical disability or infirmity that 
has troubled the  individual for the  past year and  is  likely to  go  on  troubling the 
individual in the future (1987 definition) or does not have a chronic physical or mental 
health problem, illness or disability (1995 and 2000 definition)) 
  1987 1995 2000 1995/ POOL 1987 1995 2000 1995/ POOL 1987 1995 2000 1995/ POOL 
   2000     2000     2000  
Average number of visits 6.5 5.6 6.4 6.0 6.1 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 4.0 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.7 
 (9.8) (8.1) (7.8) (8.0) (8.7) (5.7) (4.3) (4.1) (4.2) (4.7) (7.6) (6.0) (5.8) (5.9) (6.5) 
Percentage with at least one 
GP visit 
70.9 80.9 85.6 83.1 78.8 52.9 64.2 66.9 65.5 61.5 59.1 69.6 72.5 71.0 67.1 
Average number of visits for 9.1 7.0 7.4 7.2 7.8 5.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 4.0 6.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.4 
those with at least one visit (10.5) (8.5) (8.0) (8.3) (9.1) (7.0) (4.9) (4.6) (4.7) (5.5) (8.8) (6.7) (6.3) (6.5) (5.4) 
 
 
 
Table 2 Average Number of GP Visits by Year and Medical Card Eligibility 
 
MEDICAL CARD NO MEDICAL CARD ALL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: (i) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3 Frequency of GP Visits 
 
1987 1995 2000 POOL 
GP VISITS N % N % N % N % 
0 2744 40.9 2156 30.4 1831 27.5 6,731 32.9 
1 810 12.1 1220 17.2 1106 16.6 3,136 15.3 
2 637 9.5 1097 15.5 1099 16.5 2,833 13.8 
3 381 5.7 574 8.1 561 8.4 1,516 7.4 
4 348 5.2 554 7.8 573 8.6 1,475 7.2 
5 184 2.7 219 3.1 199 3.0 602 2.9 
6 332 5.0 353 5.0 369 5.5 1,054 5.2 
7 61 0.9 60 0.9 64 1.0 185 0.9 
8 99 1.5 88 1.2 100 1.5 287 1.4 
9 19 0.3 18 0.3 12 0.2 49 0.2 
10 124 1.9 127 1.8 115 1.7 366 1.8 
11 4 0.1 6 0.1 5 0.1 15 0.1 
12 625 9.3 394 5.6 415 6.2 1,434 7.0 
13+ 345 5.1 230 3.2 208 3.1 783 3.8 
Total 6,713 100.0 7,096 100.0 6,657 100.0 20,466 100.0 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
VARIABLE 1987 1995 2000 POOL 
GPVISITS 4.0 3.4 3.6 3.7 
 (7.6) (6.0) (5.8) (6.5) 
GPPOS 0.59 0.70 0.73 0.67 
 
Age 16-24 
 
15.1 
 
19.4 
 
17.3 
 
17.3 
Age 25-34 18.9 17.1 14.4 16.8 
Age 35-44 18.0 18.2 18.0 18.0 
Age 45-54 17.3 16.9 17.9 17.3 
Age 55-64 14.8 13.3 14.6 14.2 
Age 65+ 16.0 15.1 17.8 16.3 
 
Female 
 
52.6 
 
52.5 
 
53.7 
 
52.9 
Male 47.4 47.5 46.3 47.1 
 
Married 
 
65.5 
 
59.2 
 
58.2 
 
61.0 
Separated/Divorced 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.2 
Widowed 6.5 6.3 6.9 6.6 
Single 26.1 32.5 32.1 30.3 
 
Employed 
 
46.9 
 
48.6 
 
53.4 
 
49.6 
Unemployed 10.4 6.5 3.2 6.7 
Inactive 42.7 44.9 43.5 43.7 
 
Rural 
 
47.5 
 
50.9 
 
52.0 
 
50.2 
Urban 52.5 49.1 48.0 49.8 
 
Primary 
 
51.6 
 
34.3 
 
30.5 
 
38.8 
Lower Secondary 20.5 24.2 23.0 22.6 
Upper Secondary 18.5 28.8 29.5 25.7 
Third Level 9.4 12.7 17.0 13.0 
 
Income 
 
1.08 
 
1.66 
 
2.15 
 
1.63 
 (0.78) (1.10) (1.32) (1.17) 
 
Medical Card 
 
34.7 
 
32.3 
 
30.0 
 
32.3 
No Medical Card 65.3 67.7 70.0 67.7 
 
Insurance 
 
27.5 
 
41.0 
 
46.0 
 
38.1 
No Insurance 72.5 59.0 54.0 61.9 
 
Birth 
 
2.2 
 
1.6 
 
1.4 
 
1.7 
No Birth 97.8 98.4 98.6 98.3 
 
GHQ 
 
1.06 
 
1.18 
 
1.09 
 
1.11 
 (2.06) (2.32) (2.26) (2.22) 
Note: (i) For the continuous/ordinal variables (GPVISITS, equivalised household income and GHQ), the summary 
statistics are the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) while for the remainder of the variables which 
are discrete, the summary statistics refer to the percentage of the sample in that particular category. 
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Table 4 continued  
Variable 1987 1995 2000 POOL 
Disease 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 
System 1.6 1.7 2.3 1.8 
Mental 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.8 
Nerve 1.0 1.4 0.9 1.1 
Circ 4.3 3.4 4.0 3.9 
Resp 1.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 
Digest 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Headache 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Musculo 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.6 
Accident 4.4 4.3 5.3 4.6 
Other 1.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 
No Health Condition 82.9 82.9 80.7 82.1 
 
Year87 
 
100.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
32.8 
Year95 0.0 100.0 0.0 34.7 
Year00 0.0 0.0 100.0 32.5 
 
Med87 
 
34.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
11.4 
Note: (i) For the continuous/ordinal variables (GPVISITS, equivalised household income and GHQ), the summary 
statistics are the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) while for the remainder of the variables which 
are discrete, the summary statistics refer to the percentage of the sample in that particular category. 
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Table 5 Marginal Effects (with no additional regressors) 
 
 (1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
ZINB 
(3) 
GNBREG 
(4) 
PROBIT 
(5) 
TRNBIN 
Medical Card 3.82 
(0.15)*** 
4.19 
(0.17)*** 
3.84 
(0.15)*** 
0.19 
(0.01)*** 
0.95 
(0.05)*** 
Year87 
 
0.50 
(0.14)*** 
 
1.83 
(0.21)*** 
 
0.49 
(0.15)*** 
 
-0.14 
(0.01)*** 
 
0.54 
(0.06)*** 
Year95 
 
-0.16 
(0.09)* 
 
-0.18 
(0.10)* 
 
-0.18 
(0.09)** 
 
-0.04 
(0.01)*** 
 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Med87 
 
-0.30 
(0.17)* 
 
-3.51 
(0.20)*** 
 
-0.31 
(0.17)* 
 
-0.03 
(0.02)* 
 
-0.25 
(0.06)*** 
Number of Observations 20,466 20,466 20,466 20,466 13,735 
Log-Likelihood -47,093.99 -46,824.94 -46,749.26 -12,471.47 -34,284.02 
AIC 94,195.974 93,665.746 93,514.520 24,950.942 68,576.049 
BIC 94,227.680 93,729.158 93,577.932 24,982.648 68,606.159 
AIC 93,526.991 
BIC 93,590.403 
Notes:    (i) Standard errors, which are adjusted for the clustering of observations by household, are reported in 
parentheses. 
(ii) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6 Marginal Effects (with additional regressors) 
 
 (1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
ZINB 
(3) 
GNBREG 
(4) 
PROBIT 
(5) 
TRNBIN 
Medical Card 1.40 
(0.12)*** 
1.36 
(0.14)*** 
1.41 
(0.11)*** 
0.14 
(0.01)*** 
0.38 
(0.04)*** 
 
Year87 
 
0.27 
(0.11)*** 
 
1.12 
(0.16)*** 
 
0.28 
(0.11)** 
 
-0.11 
(0.01)*** 
 
0.40 
(0.05)*** 
 
Year95 
 
-0.12 
(0.07)* 
 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
 
-0.02 
(0.01)* 
 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
 
Med87 
 
0.01 
 
-0.30 
 
0.07 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.11 
 (0.14) (0.15)* (0.13) (0.02)** (0.05)** 
 
Age 25-34 
 
0.36 
 
0.39 
 
0.49 
 
0.01 
 
0.14 
 (0.14)** (0.18)** (0.14)*** (0.01) (0.06)** 
 
Age 35-44 
 
0.27 
(0.15)* 
 
0.38 
(0.19)** 
 
0.40 
(0.15)*** 
 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
 
0.16 
(0.06)** 
 
Age 45-54 
 
0.12 
 
0.22 
 
0.25 
 
-0.02 
 
0.08 
 (0.156) (0.19) (0.15)* (0.02) (0.06) 
 
Age 55-64 
 
0.62 
 
0.67 
 
0.70 
 
0.01 
 
0.22 
 (0.186)*** (0.21)*** (0.17)*** (0.02) (0.06)*** 
 
Age 65+ 
 
1.04 
(0.19)*** 
 
0.92 
(0.22)*** 
 
0.90 
(0.17)*** 
 
0.11 
(0.02)*** 
 
0.25 
(0.06)*** 
 
Female 
 
0.62 
(0.06)*** 
 
0.53 
(0.08)*** 
 
0.53 
(0.06)*** 
 
0.08 
(0.01)*** 
 
0.14 
(0.03)*** 
 
Married 
 
0.45 
 
0.18 
 
0.35 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 (0.10)*** (0.12) (0.09)*** (0.01)*** (0.04) 
 
Separated/Divorced 
 
0.39 
 
0.22 
 
0.45 
 
0.08 
 
0.03 
 (0.22)* (0.25) (0.23)** (0.02)*** (0.08) 
 
Widowed 
 
0.58 
 
0.25 
 
0.33 
 
0.11 
 
0.06 
 (0.16)*** (0.17) (0.14)** (0.02)*** (0.05) 
 
Employed 
 
-0.35 
(0.08)*** 
 
-0.49 
(0.10)*** 
 
-0.42 
(0.08)*** 
 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
 
-0.15 
(0.03)*** 
 
Unemployed 
 
-0.49 
(0.14)*** 
 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
 
-0.47 
(0.14)*** 
 
-0.07 
(0.02)*** 
 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
 
Rural 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 (0.06)** (0.07) (0.06) (0.01)*** (0.03) 
 
Lower Secondary 
 
-0.32 
(0.08)*** 
 
-0.47 
(0.10)*** 
 
-0.35 
(0.08)*** 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.15 
(0.04)*** 
 
Upper Secondary 
 
-0.44 
(0.09)*** 
 
-0.58 
(0.11)*** 
 
-0.41 
(0.09)*** 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.19 
(0.04)*** 
 
Third Level 
 
-0.46 
(0.10)*** 
 
-0.67 
(0.12)*** 
 
-0.42 
(0.10)*** 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
-0.25 
(0.05)*** 
Notes:    (i) Standard errors, which are adjusted for the clustering of observations by household, are reported in 
parentheses. 
(ii) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6 continued  
 (1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
ZINB 
(3) 
GNBREG 
(4) 
PROBIT 
(5) 
TRNBIN 
Income 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.004 
 (0.03)*** (0.04) (0.03)** (0.004)*** (0.01) 
Insurance 0.01 -0.21 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.10)** (0.08) (0.01)*** (0.04)** 
Birth 5.48 
(0.42)*** 
5.22 
(0.45)*** 
5.29 
(0.43)*** 
0.23 
(0.01)*** 
0.98 
(0.06)*** 
Disease 5.05 
(0.739)*** 
5.10 
(0.77)*** 
4.58 
(0.67)*** 
0.21 
(0.03)*** 
0.95 
(0.10)*** 
System 4.51 
(0.406)*** 
4.18 
(0.40)*** 
4.05 
(0.36)*** 
0.24 
(0.01)*** 
0.82 
(0.06)*** 
Nervous 4.43 
(0.56)*** 
4.06 
(0.57)*** 
3.85 
(0.48)*** 
0.24 
(0.02)*** 
0.79 
(0.09)*** 
Mental 3.67 
(0.63)*** 
3.69 
(0.67)*** 
3.54 
(0.58)*** 
0.19 
(0.03)*** 
0.76 
(0.11)*** 
Circulatory 4.67 
(0.30)*** 
4.45 
(0.29)*** 
4.17 
(0.25)*** 
0.25 
(0.01)*** 
0.85 
(0.05)*** 
Respiratory 5.89 
(0.47)*** 
5.42 
(0.47)*** 
5.18 
(0.42)*** 
0.24 
(0.01)*** 
1.00 
(0.06)*** 
Digestive 
 
5.30 
(0.87)*** 
 
4.81 
(0.83)*** 
 
4.58 
(0.69)*** 
 
0.23 
(0.02)*** 
 
0.91 
(0.11)*** 
Headache 3.22 2.63 2.67 0.07 0.77 
 (0.97)*** (0.94)*** (0.92)*** (0.09) (0.15)*** 
Musculo-Skeletal 
 
4.10 
(0.28)*** 
 
3.86 
(0.29)*** 
 
3.55 
(0.24)*** 
 
0.22 
(0.01)*** 
 
0.80 
(0.05)*** 
Accident 
 
8.73 
(1.34)*** 
 
8.81 
(1.29)*** 
 
7.95 
(1.17)*** 
 
0.18 
(0.03)*** 
 
1.33 
(0.12)*** 
Other 
 
3.25 
(0.54)*** 
 
2.91 
(0.59)*** 
 
2.93 
(0.55)*** 
 
0.16 
(0.02)*** 
 
0.67 
(0.11)*** 
GHQ 
 
0.29 
(0.03)*** 
 
0.30 
(0.04)*** 
 
0.30 
(0.03)*** 
 
0.03 
(0.01)*** 
 
0.09 
(0.01)*** 
GHQ2 
 
-0.10 
(0.003)*** 
 
-0.01 
(0.004)** 
 
-0.01 
(0.003)*** 
 
-0.001 
(0.001)* 
 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
Number of Observations 20,466 20,466 20,466 20,466 13,735 
Log-Likelihood -44,857.32 -44,234.01 -44,111.96 -11,306.43 -32,838.51 
AIC 89,784.640 88,608.02 88,363.920 22,682.860 65,747.020 
BIC 90,062.068 89,162.88 88,918.776 22,960.288 66,010.490 
AIC 88,429.880 
BIC 88,984.736 
Notes:    (i) Standard errors, which are adjusted for the clustering of observations by household, are reported in 
parentheses. 
(ii) *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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